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Abstract 
Two principals engage in Hotelling competition for an agent's services under incomplete information as 
to her outside option (location). This renders the agent's participation decision probabilistic from the 
perspective of each principal. Regardless of the market structure at equilibrium the optimal contract 
features a trade-off between participation probability and incentives. Rent and effort are inversely related 
and non-monotonic in the agent's transport cost and so in market structures; they increase (decrease) 
with competition. Uncertainty as to the agent's location may increase or decrease the rent compared to 
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Two principals engage in Hotelling competition for an agent’s services under incomplete
information as to her outside option (location). This renders the agent’s participation deci-
sion probabilistic from the perspective of each principal. Regardless of the market structure
at equilibrium the optimal contract features a trade-off between participation probability and
incentives. Rent and effort are inversely related and non-monotonic in the agent’s transport
cost and so in market structures; they increase (decrease) with competition. Uncertainty as
to the agent’s location may increase or decrease the rent compared to full information. This
correspondingly harms or benefits principals.
Keywords: moral hazard, asymmetric information, contract, participation constraint,
principal-agent. JEL Classification: D82,D86.
1 Introduction
The canonical model of moral hazard takes the agent’s outside option as exogenous and known to
the principal designing the incentive contract. Assuming so is natural to focus attention on the
incentive problem, which is then the sole source of frictions.
This assumption does not match most situations. In the labor market for example an employer
must overcome both the “compensating differential” (see for example Rosen, 1983) and the terms
of any competing offer.1 It is easy to argue that in most cases that information is private to
∗School of Economics, The University of Sydney; guillaume.roger72@gmail.com. I owe special thanks to Peter
Bardsley for his help and to Jean-Charles Rochet for some insightful discussions. Thank you to Guido Friebel for
reading revisions, and to an anonymous Associate Editor and two Referees for helpful and constructive comments.
1“[F]irms an workers exchange wage-job attributes bundles in an implicit market.” (Ho, 2012)
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the prospective employee. We see this routinely in academic recruiting, where new hires have
idiosyncratic preferences. Some people refuse to work for tobacco manufacturers or for defense
contractors on ethical grounds. Overcoming this compensating differential can be costly: when he
was hired away from Royal Bank of Scotland by Westpac (an Australian bank) CEO Brian Hartzer
was reportedly paid a lump-sum of $7M to be lured.
Casting aside the question of participation is not without loss because the participation decision
interacts with the incentives through wealth effects. That is, information about the agent’s outside
option has a bearing on the optimal contract. A new participation-incentive trade-off emerges, with
consequences for the power of incentives and therefore the optimal action.
To introduce competition and uncertainty I embed a principal-agent problem in a Hotelling
model. Principals are located at the extremes of an interval containing a single agent whose
location is her private information. The Hotelling structure allows for the interpretation of the
total transport cost (distance × unit cost) as the compensating differential. Alternatively the
distance between the agent and a principal can be interpreted as the degree of fitness of a match.
A better match is more productive here because it allows for stronger incentives to be offered.
The participation-incentive trade-off arises because how important it is to secure participation
depends on the principals’ expected payoff – not on the agent’s exogenous outside option. To
transfer utility to the agent most efficiently principals improve the insurance properties of the
contract. Inframarginal types respond by selecting a lower action than they otherwise would,
which entails a social cost. This connection between insurance and effort underpins most results.
When principals compete even the marginal agent receives a rent, and increasing competition
exacerbates rent-giving: the (endogenous) outside option of the agent increases, and the principals
must offer more. This also induces weaker incentives through the insurance effect. Hence with
more substitutable, or with more profitable, principals, the agent receives a higher rent and works
less. This is reminiscent of the dot-com bubble of the late 1990’s, when firms competed for workers
for very little effort in return.2 To counter this costly rent-giving employers, if they could, should
2Witness “tolinrome”’s (a pseudo) account: “Everyday we had catered lunches, I mean nice stuff [...] IT employees
had their DSL bills paid every month and they paid for everyone’s cell phone [...]. They even flew me twice to
HQ in SF for a meeting and paid everything [...] I worked about 2 hours a day and spent the rest of the time
cruising around SF. Another time we had an IT meeting there, flew me out again, stayed at a ranch in Napa
valley area, horseback riding, spa, everything.” Source: http://techtalk.dice.com/t5/Off-Topic-Other-Archive/Crazy-
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emphasize differentiation.
Incomplete information has ambiguous effects on rents and effort that depend on the agent’s
location. When she is very contestable, incomplete information tames Bertrand competition for the
agent because the participation-incentive trade-off caps rent-giving. So if they could, firm should
commit to remain ignorant of the worker’s outside option some of the time. Conversely, a principal
cannot take advantage of the agent’s proximity and offer a “cheap” contract; the participation-
incentive trade-off, not the actual location, pins the marginal participating type.
The optimal action is non-monotonic in the transport cost. For a high transport cost the princi-
pals operate as local monopolists; the outside option is high and renders effort costly. Participation
mechanically increases as the transport cost drops, which modifies the participation-incentive trade-
off; the cost of effort decreases. Incentives become stronger, until principals start competing. At
that point the marginal type becomes increasingly contestable and is thus able to extract an in-
creasing rent; then effort drops. To return to the introductory application, both compensating
differential and competing offer(s) matter, depending on the equilibrium market structure.
This paper belongs to the broad literature on moral hazard (Mirrlees, 1975; Holmström, 1977,
1979; Rogerson, 1985b; Page, 1987; Jewitt, 1988; Conlon, 2008, 2009). More closely related is the
work of Kadan and Swinkels (2010), who study a principal’s incentives to alter the agent’s action as
payment constraints vary. Their principal employs more than one agent whose reservation utilities
are observable. The participation problem is standard but with more than one agent, the principal
may either ask less effort of everyone, or employ fewer people and ask more effort of them. The
single-agent framework neutralizes these incentive problems and focuses on participation.
I purposefully do not adopt a model of common agency (Aubert,2005; Célérier, 2012). Common
agency drastically modifies the principals’ incentives in their contract offers, and therefore the
agent’s action in response. In Bisin and Guaitoli’s work (2004) competing principals may offer
contracts that induce the low action in equilibrium; they feature full insurance and generate zero
profit. Principals may induce the high action and secure positive profits by also offering latent
contracts that are not active in equilibrium. These latent contracts deter the other principals from
offering more attractive contracts. Attar et al (2006, 2007a, 2007b) show that restricting attention
to take-it-or-leave-it offers in such a context entails a loss of generality. Exclusive contracting (here)
stories-from-the-dotcom-peak/td-p/128704
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allows for take-it-or-leave-it offers and affords a clean characterization. Parlan and Rajan (2001)
also study common agency however without asymmetric information; instead failure is strategic.
The incentives of agents to engage in strategic failure weakens the principals’ incentives to compete
for agents; it breaks the Bertrand logic. Here the Bertrand logic is broken by the participation-
incentive trade off.
There is a burgeoning literature on moral hazard in a market context (Besley and Ghatak,
2005; Dam and Perez-Castrillo, 2006; Macho-Stadler et al, 2014; Serfes, 2008; Terviö, 2008). All
these papers feature heterogenous agents, an assignment problem and no private information. A
good match is important because agent’s characteristics affects their productivity; for each (publicly
observable) type there exists an optimal contract. Through competitive matching an agent’s outside
option is given by the next best match – the competing offer in this paper. But here heterogeneity
is orthogonal to productivity so types cannot be screened and heterogeneity does not enter the
incentive problem. This paper also departs from Besley and Ghatak (2005) precisely because the
agent’s type affects her outside option but not her productivity. Serfes (2008) and Dam and Pérez-
Castrillo (2006) show that identical principals obtain identical profits (zero when the market is
short on agents). Here the principals always receive ex ante positive profits under uncertainty
thanks to the participation-incentive trade-off, even though the market is always short on agents.
As in Jullien (2000) and Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1995) the outside option is type dependent.
But it does not affect the agent’s production technology, and so does not directly affect incentives.
This paper also bears an obvious connection to the work of Rochet and Stole (2002), who study
random outside option under adverse selection. Further discussion of the relation between their
work and this one is postponed to Section 5.
2 Model
Description. There are two principals, P0 and P1, located at the extremes of an interval of length
1, and a lone agent who can contract with at most one principal. At cost c(a), c′, c′′, c′′′ ≥ 0, the





Q ⊂ R+ with conditional distribution F (q|a) and corresponding density f(q|a) > 0. The likelihood
ratio fa(q|a)/f(q|a) is increasing (MLRP), and concave in q. I also impose that Fa(F−1(q, a)|a)
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be convex in (q, a), which is sufficient for Concave Local Informativeness (CLI). The agent receives
a transfer t; her net utility is given by v(t, a) ≡ u(t) − c(a), where u : R 7→ R is a continuous,
increasing and (strictly) concave function. The principal receives a net payoff S(t; q) = q − t if
contracting with the agent, and zero otherwise. A contract C = (t(q), a) is an effort recommendation
a and a transfer function t. As in Holmström’s original model, I take t(q) to be equicontinuous.3
Throughout I assume that the conditions of the first-order approach (FOA) hold – see Jewitt (1988).
In particular, u and u′ do not diverge – see Moroni and Swinkels (2014).
An agent who does not contract receives 0. An agent has a type d ∈ [0, 1], which is private
information and follows the common knowledge, symmetric distribution G(d) with log-concave
density g(·) > 0. Let γ > 0 denote the transportation cost in the Hotelling tradition; a lower γ
thus means more substitution. If contracting with P0, the agent pays a cost γ · d, which therefore
represent her outside option. Let U1 be the expected utility induced by P1’s offer; the net utility of
this contract is U1 − γ · (1− d). The agent takes P0’s contract only if it dominates any alternative:
U0 − γ · d ≥ max
{
0, U1 − γ · (1− d)
}
. The outside option generated is private to the agent
and treated as a random variable (by the principals). Furthermore, because F (q|a) and c(a) are
independent of d, screening is not possible (see Proposition 6). The timing is standard: (i) the
principals each offer a contract Ci, i = 0, 1; (ii) the location d is known to the agent only; (iii)
the agent accepts one contract or rejects them all. If accepting, she also chooses an action a; (iv)
action a generates an outcome q ∈ Q.
For large enough γ, the principals do not compete for the agent at equilibrium; the market is
not covered in equilibrium. The agent may work for either principal or not at all. For γ small
enough, the principals do compete for the agent’s services; the market is covered and the contracts
are best response to each other; they form a Nash equilibrium.
This formulation allows for competition only at the participation stage; it nests three models









and πa(t, a) ≡ ∂π(t, a)/∂a, Ua ≡ ∂U(t, a)/∂a. Let δU = u′f(q|a) denote the Fréchet derivative of
3See Holmström (1977) for details. Restricting attention to this family of functions t(·) comes at little cost.
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U , and likewise for other functionals.
Preliminaries. In the standard model there is a single principal and the agent’s outside option ū
is known to all parties. The principal maximizes π(t, a) subject to participation (U(t, a) ≥ ū) and
incentive compatibility (Ua(t, a) = 0 under the FOA). This is a well known problem; Holmström






, λ > 0 (2.1)
πa + µUaa = 0. (2.2)
Remark 1 In the standard model the optimal action is decreasing in the outside option ū.4
3 Analysis
Let d̃ denote the marginal participating agent. The agent’s participation decision defines a random





γd̃, U1 − γ(1− 2d̃)
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Ua(t, a) = 0 (3.1)
The objective function includes the stochastic participation decision and is non-monotone concave,
unlike the standard problem.5 This is depicted in Figure 1, where the horizontal axis represents an
increase in t for any q. In the standard problem (left), increasing t is a strict cost for the principal;
here (right) it increases the participation probability up to a point – hence non-monotonicity.
Principals are local monopolists whenever γ > U0 + U1; otherwise there is competition at
equilibrium. Which of these inequalities holds is determined in equilibrium. For now I study each
case in turn and postpone that other question.
4Proof upon request; in the same spirit as that of Proposition 1.








Since only one firm is considered in this section I drop the subscripts. The one complication is
whether the marginal participating agent d̃ sits at location 1 or strictly below. The solution turns
out to be continuous all the way to d̃ = 1. In what follows I lay out P0’s problem in either case.
At d̃ = 1, G(d̃ = 1) = 1, adopt the convention that g(d̃ = 1) = 0; when d̃ < 1, G(d̃) < 1 and




π(t, a) s.t. Ua(t, a) = 0 and U(t, a) = γ








π(t, a) s.t. Ua(t, a) = 0
The second line comes directly from Problem 1. The first one features G(U/γ) = G(d̃ = 1) = 1;
at that point any agent participates so the rent should be capped at U(t, a) = γ · d̃ = γ. Attach
Lagrange multiplier λ to that constraint; maximizing with respect to a always yields
G(U(t, a)/γ)πa(t, a) + µUaa(t, a) = 0, (3.2)
almost as in the standard problem (and where G(U(t, a)/γ) may be 1). Because g(·) is log-concave,
so is G(·); with δU(t, a) > 0 and δπ(t) < 0, the second-order condition is immediately verified.




 λ(γ) + µM
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u(t(z))dF (z|a)− c(a) is a linear functional and the critical d satisfies U(t, a) = γ · d.
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where µ̂M = µ/G(U(t, a)/γ) = −πa/Uaa. The first line is as the standard case. The second equality
defines a fixed-point problem in a space T of functions defined on Q. The solution, if it exists, is











, α ∈ R+
which now resembles the standard Condition (2.1).7 Recalling that U(t, a)/γ = d̃,
Theorem 1 A solution to Problem 2 is a transfer function tM , an action aM and a pair of real
numbers α, µ̂M such that Conditions (3.2), (3.3), the constraint (3.1) and U(t, a) = γ · d̃ for some
d̃ simultaneously hold, with
αM (d̃) =
 λ(γ), if d̃ = 1;g(U(t,a)/γ)
G(U(t,a)/γ)
π(t,a)
γ , if d̃ < 1.
(3.4)




The principal faces a trade-off between incentives and participation. This trade-off is captured by
the term [g(ū/γ)/G(ū/γ)][π(ū/γ)/γ] and is depicted in the right-hand panel of Figure 1. When the
solution is interior (i) participation is not guaranteed, even if it is profitable to the principal (who
would benefit from more information to increase it) and (ii) the expected marginal benefits of the



























= λS(ū): the marginal cost is equated to the agent’s opportunity cost, regardless
of the principal’s benefit. Uncertainty about the agent’s outside option restores some bargaining
power.
7α < 0 ⇔ π(t, a) < 0 and the principal prefers to not contract.
8
Holmström’s (1977) insight is affirmed by Condition (3.3): the transfer tM (q) tracks the like-
lihood ratio fa/f . However surplus sharing varies according to the principal’s marginal benefit of
participation. This alters the incentive properties of the optimal contact. For any d, denote by(
tS(d), aS(d)
)
the contract under full information (i.e. solving (2.1) and (2.2)).
Proposition 1 Take d̃ ∈ (0, 1] such that U(tM , aM ) = γ · d̃. For all d < d̃, aM (d) < aS(d).
The principal induces a lower action from inframarginal types than if their outside option were
known and they were offered the corresponding optimal contract. Their incentives are too weak.
Increasing the probability G (U(t, a)/γ ≥ d) of acceptance requires increasing the induced expected
utility U(t, a). The principal transfers utility most cheaply to the risk-averse agent by improving the
insurance properties of the contract – not just to by increasing the transfer. To improve insurance
he increases t in low-income states (where fa < 0) and decreases it in high-income states (where
fa > 0).
8 This is bad for incentives. The expected utility U(tM , aM ) just satisfies type d̃ but
entails excessive insurance for all others accepting the contract. The principal would benefit from
information about the agent’s type to provide stronger incentives.
3.2 Competitive setting
When γ is low enough the principals compete for the marginal agent who is identified by the
standard condition d̂ = (γ + U0 − U1)/2γ: the outside option is the (endogenous) competitor’s













[x− t0(x)] dF (x|a0) s.t. (3.1)
where U i ≡ U(ti, ai). Because the agent chooses a, after agreeing to participate, subgame perfection
in a immediately yields the envelope condition (3.2) – up to the exact definition of d̂. Optimizing












and similarly for P1. By extension of Theorem 1 (in the Appendix) a solution to (3.6) exists.
8U is concave: take a variation with respect to t : u′f > 0 (with the envelope condition Ua = 0) and u
′′f < 0.
9There exists a unique equilibrium of this game; strict diagonal concavity of the objective function is satisfied
(Rosen, 1965). Proof upon request.
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Proposition 2 In the unique, symmetric Nash equilibrium of the contract game, for each principal,
the equilibrium contracts are characterized by (aC , tC) such that
1
2














The contract commits a fixed share g (1/2) /γ of the principal’s profits π to the agent.10 The
competitor’s offer depends on γ, which parametrizes the intensity of competition. Participation
remains stochastic, so the participation-incentive trade-off remains. Because contracting is exclusive
the incentive component (µ/G(d̂))(fa/f) of the best reply is substantively unchanged.
3.3 Equilibrium market structure
Whether the principals compete depends on γ. For any economy (Q, c(·), F (q|a)), there exists a
critical value of γ such that
U(tM , aM ) = γ · 1
2
= U(tC , aC),
where 1/2 is the location of the agent that is just attracted under either regime. Let this relation
identify γ∗. For γ ≤ γ∗ competition prevails; otherwise either principal is a monopolist. As shown
in Proposition 2 the transition is smooth.
4 Information, market structure and outcomes
Effort may vary according to the information structure as well as market structure. I study each
in turn, beginning with the impact of uncertainty in a (imperfectly) competitive market.
4.1 The impact of uncertainty
If d were known principals would engage in Bertrand competition for the agent. This process
implies that U0 − γ · d = U1 − γ · (1 − d); so the agent would always contract with the principal
closest to her. Let U
1
denote the level of utility such that π1(U
1
) = 0; this is the most utility P1
can bestow to the agent. Let d0(γ) the corresponding type; it is defined by the relation
U
1 − γ · (1− d) = 0,










so d0(γ) ∈ [0, 1/2] (otherwise P1 cannot even contest the agent), and is increasing in γ (similarly
d1(γ) for P1). There are two cases to consider. First, for any d < d
0(γ), P0 would be a monopolist in
equilibrium if d were known because P1 could not offer more than U
1
. Second, for d0(γ) ≤ d ≤ 1/2,
the agent would be contestable by both principals. Figure 2 helps fixing ideas (horizontal axis).
Proposition 3 Whether incomplete information generates higher rents and induces a lower action
than complete information depends on the agent’s location.
1. If d ≤ d0(γ), P0 would be a monopolist under complete information. The rent is higher and
the equilibrium action is lower than if the outside option were known; i.e. aC < a(d).
2. If d > d0(γ), principals would compete under complete information. There exists a d0c(γ) ∈
(d0(γ), 1/2] such that
(a) If d ∈ (d0(γ), d0c(γ)), the equilibrium rent is higher and the action is lower than if the
outside option were known; i.e. aC < a(d); and
(b) if d ∈ (d0c(γ), 1/2], the equilibrium rent is lower and the action is higher than if the
outside option were known; i.e. aC > a(d)
Incomplete information induces a lower rent (and higher action) when the agent is highly con-
testable. If they had an information acquisition technology, principals should commit themselves
to not use it at least some of the time. Conversely, if agents could credibly disclose some infor-
mation, they should claim indifference. Cremer (1995) also shows that less information about the
agent’s type is better in a two-period model of moral hazard and adverse selection. His princi-
pal can generate stronger effort incentives through willful ignorance about the agent’s productiv-
ity. Then following an adverse outcome in period one there cannot be any renegotiation and the
agent may exert a second-period effort in excess of the second-best. Here ignorance introduces
the participation-incentive trade-off, which curbs rent giving. If the principals knew the agent’s
location they would always compete away their rents (item 2 of the Proposition). So the lack
of information acts like a commitment device; in Cremer (1995) it prevents renegotiation, here it
limits competition.
On Figure 2 we see that when d̃ > 1/2, P ′0s profit under complete information is naught, the










increases when the agent is closer to P0 (< 1/2); at the point d
0
c(γ) the two are equal. So on the
range [d0c(γ), 1/2], P0 is better off not knowing d̃. As d̃ decreases further this is no longer true; the
lack of information leads P0 to offer too much to the agent. The slope of π0 changes at the point
d0(γ) precisely because the agent becomes contestable: moving slightly to the right of d0(γ) not
only increases γ · d, it also invites offer from P1.
Under Item 1 the agent is too far away from P1 to even be contestable under complete informa-
tion. But when d̃ is unknown the principals engage in wasteful competition for the agent: P0 must
offer a contract that is attractive to a type (fictitiously) located at least at 1/2. Then the logic of
Proposition 1 applies.
Item 2 asserts that when the agent is highly contestable (> d0c(γ)), incomplete information
tames principal competition. Suppose the agent is located at d = 1/2. Under complete information
competition dissipates all the principals’ profit; the agent’s rent is the highest and she works the
least. Under asymmetric information, the participation-incentive trade-off guarantees that not
too much utility is transferred to the agent – see the FOC (3.6). Each principal ends up with
a participation probability of 1/2 and positive expected profits (Condition 3.8). As the agent
moves towards P0, that principal’s full-information profit increases and reaches the level of the
incomplete-information profit at d0c(γ). Past that point the logic of Item 1 prevails again.
4.2 Market structure, rent and action
Here I attempt to understand how participation levels and effort behave as γ varies over wide
enough a range for either monopoly or duopoly to arise in equilibrium.
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Proposition 4 The participation probability G(d̃) increases as γ decreases and G(d̃) = 1 ∀γ ≤ γ∗.
The rent is U-shaped and the effort hump-shaped in γ; they, respectively,
• decreases (increases) as γ increases towards γ∗ (under competition); and
• increases (decreases) beyond γ∗ (under monopoly).
Under monopoly a lower γ has two effects. First there is a direct effect: fix the contract (fix U0),
decreasing γ mechanically increases the participation probability G(U0/γ). This is the market
share effect (extensive margin). As participation increases exogenously through the market share
effect, the principal offers a steeper contract that induces a higher action. This is the second effect
– the margin effect (intensive margin). More can be demanded from the agent because the cost of
any action decreases.
As γ keeps decreasing below γ∗, one switches to the competitive regime. In equilibrium, the
exogenous market share effect disappears altogether (see Condition (3.8)). In response to compe-
tition rents must increase in the form of a lower-power contract to secure participation (from the
marginal agent). A natural implication is that when agents are more contestable principals should
differentiate more to preserve the incentive power of monetary transfers.
4.3 Welfare implications
The impact of uncertainty on welfare is not entirely obvious prima facie. The principal is effort-
constrained: µM , µC > 0 so that he would like a higher action. However the optimal contract
presents the risk-averse agent with better insurance, at the cost of a lower action. Let d̃0, d̃1 denote
the marginal participating types with P0, P1 (d̃0 = d̃1 = 1/2 under competition). Let social welfare
W (a) ≡ G(d̃0)
[











The first two terms are the expected joint payoff from the relationship with either principal, if it
is entered into; the last one is the value of the exogenous outside option if no contract is accepted.
Although a higher action shifts the distribution F (x|a) of the output in a first order sense, it may
not be chosen in equilibrium because too expensive. Recall the definition of d0c(γ), then
Proposition 5 Suppose d ≤ 1/2; P0 contracts with the agent and the optimal contract induces
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• lower welfare if d < d0c(γ) (whether under monopoly or duopoly), and
• higher welfare if d > d0c(γ) (always under competition)
than when the outside option is known. Similarly when d ≥ 1/2; then P1 contracts with the agent,
the critical cut-off is d1c(γ) and the inequalities are reversed.
For d < d0c(γ), the loss of welfare due to a lower action dominates the benefit of enhanced insurance,
and conversely for d > d0c(γ). This result relies on the fact that the Pareto frontier tracks the agent’s
action. Better insurance for the agent also implies rent giving, which decreases the value of effort
for the principal. When d > d0c(γ), asymmetric information caps the agent’s rent thanks to the
participation-incentive trade-off (recall Proposition 4).
5 Discussion
Screening. Menus of contract cannot make the principal better off in this model. Consider a
single principal who uses a direct revelation mechanism to elicit the agent’s private information
of the form (t(q; ū), a(ū)). Denote by ũ be the agent’s private information (type) and by û her
message. Truthful revelation requires U (t(·; ũ), a(ũ); ũ) ≥ U (t(·; û), a(û); ũ) , ∀ ũ, û. Equivalently







By (3.1), Ua = 0 and u
′(t(q))f(q|a) > 0; so truthful revelation requires ∆tū|ũ = 0. There can be
no discrimination on the basis of the outside option.
Proposition 6 A menu of contracts contingent on the agent’s outside option cannot do better than
the non-linear contract given by (3.2) and (3.3).
There is no direct connection between the agent’s type and her technology (F (q|a), c(a)), so the
output q is not informative of the type. The single-crossing property does not hold – this is the
first term of (5.1).11 A stochastic mechanism also does not help, for the same reason. Truthful
revelation requires some ex post observability of ū, which is beyond the scope of this paper.
11The single-crossing condition is lost in a broad sense: the game is not even supermodular.
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Connection to Rochet and Stole (2002). These authors (now RS) study a problem of non-
linear pricing where two principals compete on a Hotelling line; the location of the agent is private
information and orthogonal to the quality of the good. RS find three main results: (i) less distortion
for all types (with no distortion at the bottom), (ii) limited participation under monopoly and (iii)
for sufficiently competitive principals, no distortion at all. Below I contrast their findings to mine,
in the same order.
First, RS establish there is less distortion than the standard case for all types. The reason
is a trade-off between participation and incentives: inducing more participation is achieved by
increasing rents; under adverse selection this means reducing distortions in the allocation. The
same trade-off exists here but under moral hazard rents are delivered through more distortion, not
less. Second, RS show that a monopolist nonetheless never wants to induce full coverage: he should
raise his price instead. This too is motivated by the trade-off between participation and incentives:
the monopolist is better-off shutting down a measure of agents so as to not give away too much
rent. Here too the monopolist shuts down some agents (when d̃ < 1), for the same reason: inducing
more participation becomes too costly. However in some departure, full participation nonetheless
may be optimal here – when the outside option parameter γ is small enough. This difference is
grounded in the nature of the problem. In RS, the cost of shutting down the agent increases with
the type; shutting down very low types is almost costless, but the benefit (rent-saving) is always
positive. Here the cost of shutting down an agent is constant; it is independent of the agent’s type
and never vanishes.
Third, RS find there is no distortion at all when agents are sufficiently contestable; this generates
the first-best allocation. Principals compete for agent(s) by handing out rents; under adverse
selection this means reducing the incentive distortions, which improve welfare. Here fierce principal
competition is bad for welfare. It also requires handing out rents to agent, which means improving
insurance, now worsening welfare. The outcomes are different because the distortions induced by
the principals under adverse selection are privately optimal and socially inefficient but the rents
are neutral. Under moral hazard the distortions are also socially inefficient but the rents are not
neutral on effort; they amplify the distortions.
Last, RS note that the rent and the allocation rule (the control) are jointly determined. Here
too the rent and the transfer function (the control) are jointly determined.
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The linear-CARA-normal model. The CARA-normal-linear framework of Holmström and
Milgrom (1987) has become a workhorse of applied research. However it offers insights about the
effects of stochastic participation that do not extend to a more general setting.
To make the point consider the monopoly problem. Let t = α + βq be the tariff offered,
c(a) = (c/2)a2 and u = −e−r(t−c(a)), where r is the coefficient of risk aversion. Let also q ∼ N (0, σ2).















whence β = 1/(1 + rcσ2); the stochastic nature of the outside option has no consequences on
incentives. This outcome owes precisely to that specification, which neutralizes wealth effects. The
agent’s optimal action defined as a = β/c is independent of level of utility; therefore the equilibrium
slope parameter β is independent of ū. This is clearly not true according to the standard condition
1/u′ = λS + µSBfa/f (where λ ≡ λ(ū)), and even less in the FOCs (3.3) and (3.8). The CARA
specification understates the importance of the participation problem.
6 Conclusion
This paper presents a model of contracting under moral hazard when the agent’s outside option
is unknown to principals competing à la Hotelling. The model captures both imperfect principal
competition and a stochastic outside option. While in the standard model the agent always or never
participates, here she does with a non-degenerate probability. With a risk-averse agent increasing
the participation probability is best achieved by offering her better insurance; that is, incentives
are necessarily weakened.
Asymmetric information turns out to help competing principals when the agent is highly con-
testable, that is, when principals must transfer a large fraction of surplus. Because the optimal
contract entails a trade-off between incentives and participation, it guarantees that principals do
not transfer all the surplus to the agent. The agent’s rent is capped and the incentives are not
completely diluted. The equilibrium action is also responsive to the market structure. It is non-
monotonic in the Hotelling “transportation cost”. Common agency, where the agent may enter




A.1 Elements of the construction of Theorem 1
The basic idea is to view the first-order conditions as Kuhn-Tucker conditions rather than a fixed-
point problem. The proofs of Lemmata 2-4 are available upon request.
Lemma 1 Suppose the outside option ū is known to the principal. A transfer function tS(·) is
optimal if and only if it takes the form defined in (2.1) for multipliers λS , µS ≥ 0, with Ua =
0, U(t, a) = ū and λS [U(t, a)− ū] = 0. These multipliers exist; furthermore, λS , µS > 0.
See Jewitt, Kadan and Swinkels (2008) for a proof. Fix the action a, the first-order condition (2.1)
defines a function t[λS , µS ; a](q). With this, the constraints Ua = 0, U(t, a) = ū define functions






λS + µS ffa
)]












Lemma 2 Fix a. λ[ū; a] is increasing in ū.
Proof: Because u′(·) is decreasing, so is (u′)−1. The term (λS + µSf/fa)−1 clearly decreases in






is an increasing function of λS , therefore so is the LHS of the first
equation. It follows that λS [ū; a] is increasing.
At a solution the multiplier µS is strictly positive. Substitute t[λS , µS ; a](q) = t[ū, a](q) in
Condition (2.2), µ[ū, a] = − πaUaa defines now a(ū). Thus,
Lemma 3 Given ū, a solution is a tuple
(
t[ū](q), λS(ū), µS(ū), a(ū)
)
such that Condi-
tions (2.1), (2.2), Ua = 0, U(t, a) ≥ ū all bind.
For a given ū a solution exists (Lemma 1) and can be computed (Lemma 3). The optimal transfer
is then given by Condition (??). Condition (B.1) pins the value of d – the marginal agent.
Lemma 4 The multiplier µM of Condition (3.3) is strictly positive.
17
A.2 A useful Lemma
The following will be useful to prove Propositions 4 and 5.
Lemma 5 In the competitive setting under incomplete information effort decreases in the intensity
of competition γ, i.e. dai/dγ > 0, i = 0, 1.
Proof: Let aC = aCi , t
C = aCi , i = 0, 1 denote the symmetric optimal contract solving Problem 3.
Let L(γ, aC) ≡ maxa L(γ, a) be the maximum of the Lagrangean of Problem 3 under this contract;












and I need to show dadγ > 0, for which
∂2L(γ,aC)
∂a∂γ > 0 is sufficient (
∂2L(γ,aC)
∂a2
< 0). It is easier to work
with the conditions of the problem of the agent, namely Ua = 0.





where ∆t denotes a variation in t with respect to γ : ∆t = limγ2→γ1
t[γ2](q)−t[γ1](q)
γ2−γ1 and Uaa < 0. So




< 0, q < q̃;
= 0, q = q̃;
> 0, q > q̃.
Take any γ2 ↓ γ1, the corresponding transfers t[γ2], t[γ1] must take the form 1/u′ = β + µ̃fa/f .
Because the action is fixed, if t[γ1] passes through the point q̃, t[γ2] passes arbitrarily close to it
(by continuity). Then, if the contract t[γ2](q) is steeper,
t[γ2](q)
 < t[γ1](q), q < q̃ and> t[γ1](q), q > q̃.
so that
∆t
 < 0, q < q̃ and> 0, q > q̃.
12When the principal would like the agent to increase her effort, so would the agent – with the appropriate incentive.
In Problem 3 the moral hazard constraint (3.1) implies that a′ = argmaxU(t, a) implements aC = argmaxL(γ, a)




u′∆tdFa > 0 necessarily. The converse holds when t[γ2](q) is shallower. To complete the
argument, recall that in equilibrium the marginal agent is always located at d = 1/2, and that she
contracts with P0 only if U
0 ≥ U1−γ/2: the outside option of the marginal agent is decreasing in γ.
Because U0 and U1 are strategic complements they both decrease as γ increases. One can construct




u(t[γ2](x))dF (x|a[γ2]) that also
satisfies the moral hazard constraint. Take t[γ2](q) steeper than t[γ1](q) ( so t[γ2](q) single-crosses























































where the penultimate line comes from the moral hazard constraint under γ1. The last line uses
the fact that u(t[γ1](x)) − u(t[γ2](x)) > 0 and faf < 0 to the left of q̃, and conversely to its right.
So under t[γ2](q) the agent would rather pick a higher action, and it is cheaper to the principals.
Hence da/dγ > 0.
B Proofs















f + µu′fa = 0
since U(t, a) is a linear functional – and so pointwise differentiable. Re-arrange, divide by f, u′ and
G and set µ̂ = µG . Next,
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Proof: The right-hand side of Condition (B.1) is decreasing in d. Indeed the first term is clearly
decreasing in d since g(·) is assumed to be log-concave (see for example Bagnoli and Bergstrom,
2005) and the action a as fixed. Since a is fixed, the second term is also decreasing in d: increasing
the agent’s expected payoff U(t, a) can only be achieved by decreasing the principal’s expected
payoff. A sufficient condition for the equality to hold is that the function α(d) be increasing in d.
By Lemma 1 an α(d) exists for each d and by Lemma 2, α(d) is an increasing function of d. So
indeed α = g(U(t,a)/γ)G(U(t,a)/γ)
π(t,a)
γ .
When d̃ = 1 the solution is standard. The last step is to show continuity of the solution at that







 λ(γ), in the first instance; andα(d̃), when d̃ < 1.
The function u′ is continuous and monotone, therefore so is 1/u′, and
∫
Q dx is a bounded (so,
continuous) operator. Therefore, letting tα denote the transfer when d̃ < 1,












Proof of Proposition 1: Here I show that for any d < d̃ the total cost of inducing an action
is lower. For the standard problem, Jewitt has shown in two unpublished papers (1997, 2007) that




t(x)dF (a|x) s.t. U ≥ ū and Ua = 0


































where α, µ̂ are defined in equation (3.3). So α, µ̂ are increasing in d (by Lemma 2). To show C(a)
is increasing in d, rewrite it in three parts:
α
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= 0 when the PC binds and similarly for the second line
when the moral hazard constraint binds. Therefore C ′(a) is indeed positive. Last, CLI and c′′′ ≥





the principal selects a higher action for any d < d̃.
Proof of Proposition 2: First extend Theorem 1 to the best responses characterized by (3.6).
For a given U1, (3.6) rewrites 1u′ = β+ µ̂
fa
f where β ≡ β[d̂] is an increasing and continuous function
of d̂. Then apply Lemma 6, and the best response (3.6) is well defined. The first-order condition















and similarly for Principal P1. At a symmetric equilibrium, U
0 = U1, so that d̂ = 1/2, which yields
Conditions (3.7) and (3.8).
Similarly to the monopoly case hitting the boundary d̃ = 1, there is a regime switch at d̂ = 1/2.
It is isomorphic to the monopoly problem. More precisely, restate Problem 2 with d̃ = 1/2, so that
the constraint is U(t, a) = γ · d̃ = γ/2; the first-order condition is
1
u′












 2λ(γ), if γ is small enough; orα(d̃), if γ is large enough.
So at 1/2, α(1/2) = 2g(1/2)π/γ and in equilibrium λ(γ) = 2g(1/2)π/γ = β[d̂ = 1/2]). Hence by







and the solution is also continuous at 1/2.
Proof of Proposition 3: Recall the definition of d0(γ) and that it increases in γ.
Case 1. For large enough transport cost γ, d̃ < d0(γ), so the agent is not contestable under
complete information. The characterization is standard; the agent does not receive a rent. However
under incomplete information, the principal’s offer attracts all agents up to d = 1/2, so U0 ≥ γ/2 ≥
γ · d̃ ≥ 0 (strictly for d̃ < 1/2, or as soon as γ is small enough). The agent receives a rent, which
we know weakens incentives. (Proposition 1).
Case 2. When γ is small enough (d0(γ) ≤ d̃ ≤ 1/2), P0 competes à la Bertrand with P1 under
complete information (and always contracts with the agent). Let πC denote the principals’ payoff
in a Nash equilibrium and π0(U0) denote principal P0’s profit under the optimal contract when he
must give away utility U0. Under complete information, U0 must satisfy U0−γ · d̃ ≥ U1−γ ·(1− d̃).
Letting ū ≡ U1 − γ · (1 − 2d̃), P0’s problem is again the standard problem, however the level of
utility U0 that must be offered under complete information depends on the location of the agent.
It is helpful to understand the behaviour of π0(U0) as d̃ changes.
Lemma 7 The function π0(U0) is everywhere non-increasing in d̃. It reaches a maximum at






Proof: When d̃ = 1/2, U0 = ū = U
1
, that is, π0 = 0; for d̃ > 1/2 the agent contracts with P1, so
π0 = 0. Next, for d̃ < 1/2,
U0 =
 γ · d̃, for d̃ < d0(γ);U1 − γ · (1− 2d̃), d̃ > d0(γ).
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U0 is increasing in d̃ and steeper to the right of d0(γ) than to its left; so π0 decreases in d̃, and
more steeply so to the right of d0(γ). U0 is minimized (i.e. π0 maximized) for d̃ = 0. Furthermore,
because U0 = γ · d0(γ) = U1 − γ[1− d0(γ)] (this is the definition of d0(γ)) U0 is continuous at that
point. Therefore so is π0(U0).
Under asymmetric information πC > 0 always (by simple observation of the equilibrium condi-
tion (3.8)) and it is constant in the actual location of the agent. I claim that π0(U0 = γd0(γ)) > πC .
To see that, consider the limit case where γ is such that principals just compete; that is, d̃ = 1/2.
Then πC is bounded by the monopoly profit under asymmetric information (they are equal at that
point): πC ≤ π0(U0(d̃ = 1/2)). By Proposition 1 we know that for any d < d̃ = 1/2, the full
information profit exceeds π0(U0(d̃ = 1/2)), so this is true for d̃ = d0(γ). Because π0(U0) increases
as d decreases, there exists some d0c(γ) ∈ (d0(γ), 1/2) such that
π0(U0)
 > πC , if d ∈ (d0(γ), d0c(γ)); and< πC , if d ∈ (d0c(γ), 1/2).
See Figure 2. To extend to effort levels, first recall that contracts are unique, so at the point d0c(γ)
the equilibrium action is the same under symmetric and asymmetric information. Because the
solution under symmetric information must take the form λ+ µ(fa/f) we can apply Jewitt’s dual
representation as in the proof of Proposition 1, with effort monotonically increasing as d̃ decreases.
Proof of Proposition 4: For the first half apply the proof of Proposition 1 noting that
ū = γ · d; then the principal selects a lower action as γ increases. Calling on Lemma 5 proves the
second half of the Proposition.
Proof of Proposition 5: This amounts to proving that welfare increases with the agent’s
action. Equilibrium welfare W (a) rewrites
W (a) ≡ G(d̃0)
[∫











where T (a) ≡
∫
t(x)dF (x|a) is known to be an increasing, concave function (Conlon, 2008) and a is
meant as the equilibrium action across either monopoly or duopoly equilibrium. Under monopoly,
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da > (<)0. Because µ
M , µC > 0, both first-order
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